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Abstract 
We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when 
a client pays, and the payoffs to the client’s decision. We test this frame work using a new data 
set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households.  The theory predicts that bribery is 
more attractive to both parties when the client is richer, and we find empirically that both bribery 
incidence and value are increasing in household income. However, 65% of the relation between 
bribery incidence and income is explained by greater use of officials by high–income 
households, and by their use of more corrupt types of official. Compared to a client dealing with 
an honest official, a client who pays a bribe has a similar probability of concluding her business, 
while a client who refuses to bribe has a probability 16 percentage points lower. This indicates 
that service improvements in response to a bribe merely offset service reductions associated with 
angling for a bribe, and that clients refusing to bribe are punished. We use these and other results 
to argue that bribery is not a regressive tax. 
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 1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that corruption has negative economic consequences. Rose–
Ackerman’s inﬂuential early work warned that the assumptions required for corruption to
enhance eﬃciency were unlikely to be satisﬁed in practice.1 More recent theoretical con-
tributions on the causes and consequences of corruption have also emphasized eﬃciency
losses. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest that bribery of public oﬃcials has economic
eﬀects that can prove more distortionary than taxation.2 Empirical work has substan-
tiated these fears: Mauro (1995) ﬁnds cross–country evidence that corruption reduces
economic growth. Moreover, many development economists fear that corruption reduces
equity as well as eﬃciency, constituting a regressive tax, causing the poor to be excluded
from public services, and skewing growth in favor of the rich.3
Until recently, however, micro–level data measuring corruption, essential for under-
standing underlying mechanisms and distributional consequences, were lacking. Most
empirical research on the causes and consequences of corruption is not only conducted
at the macro (country) level, it is almost exclusively based on perceptions of corruption,
rather than actual, measured corruption.4 We exploit newly available data from Peru to
characterize bribery–related interactions between public oﬃcials and households, and to
measure the burden of bribery across income classes. Our paper is one of a small but
growing number using micro data on bribery. Of these, Svensson (2003), who ﬁnds that
more proﬁtable ﬁrms pay larger bribes, and Kaufmann and Wei (1999), who ﬁnd that
ﬁrms commonly paying bribes spend more time on red tape, are the only others to test
micro predictions of theoretical models of the bribery process.5
1Rose–Ackerman (1975,1978). Lui (1985) highlights the beneﬁcial side of bribery.
2See also Choi and Thum (2004), Kingston (2004), Sah (1988) and Aidt’s (2003) survey.
3E.g. Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso–Terme (1998) and Kaufmann et al. (1998).
4E.g. Fisman and Gatti (2002), Mauro (1995), Treisman (2000). Olson et al. (2000) critique this type
of data.
5Deininger and Mpuga (2004), Hunt (2004), Hunt (forthcoming), Mocan (2004) and Swamy et al.
(2001) use data on individual bribery. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) can convincingly infer corruption
at the hospital level.
1Our survey measures actual bribery, and is representative of the entire population of
a country, thus principally capturing bribes paid in the course of daily life. Such “petty”
bribes represent the most common form of corruption. These are the bribes that aﬀect the
poor most directly, and that might constitute a regressive tax. Furthermore, petty bribery
of low–level public oﬃcials can cause corruption to spread upwards through the hierarchy
of oﬃcials.6 Contagion may also occur if people who pay bribes routinely as individuals are
more willing to bribe or accept bribes in their capacity as ﬁrm representative or political
actor. In most countries, respondents to Transparency International’s Global Corruption
Barometer judged “petty or administrative” corruption to be almost as serious a problem
as “grand or political corruption.”7
Concerns about petty corruption in Peru, a middle–ranking country in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index8, led the Peruvian statistical agency to in-
clude a module on bribery in the 2002 and 2003 national household surveys. We take
advantage of the information about respondents’ use of public oﬃcials, whether they
bribed or refused to bribe, how much they paid if they bribed, as well as the quality of
the services that they received from the oﬃcial.
We ﬁrst build a theoretical framework allowing us to understand the bribery–related
interactions between public oﬃcials and clients. Under what circumstances do oﬃcials
angle for a bribe? Which clients pay and how much? What does bribery buy in terms
of service? In our model, oﬃcials angle for a bribe by shirking, and punish with further
shirking clients who refuse to bribe. Since richer clients have a higher valuation of time,
they are more willing to bribe and, conditional on bribing, pay a higher bribe. Thus,
oﬃcials are more likely to angle for a bribe from a rich client. If a client chooses to pay
a bribe, the oﬃcial rewards her with a reduction in red tape that will at least partially
oﬀset the earlier shirking.
We then evaluate the model with the data. The results suggest that it is indeed
6Cadot (1987).
7Transparency International (2004b).
8Transparency International (2004a).
2most commonly the oﬃcial who moves ﬁrst in the process leading to bribery, and that
he does take client income into account in his decisions. We ﬁnd that bribery incidence
is strongly increasing in client income. Our results suggest, however, that at least 65%
of this relationship is driven by the fact that the non–poor use more oﬃcials than the
poor, and use a more corrupt mix of oﬃcials. Therefore, at most 35% of the higher
bribery of the non–poor is owing to a higher probability of bribery conditional on using
a particular oﬃcial type. Doubling a client’s income increases this probability by 0.2
percentage points. We ﬁnd an income–elasticity of the bribe amount of about 0.3. Our
results suggest that oﬃcials practice ﬁrst–degree price discrimination rather than third–
degree price discrimination, but are not conclusive on this point.
Compared with a client dealing with an oﬃcial acting honestly, a client who pays
a bribe reluctantly has a slightly lower probability of concluding her business with the
oﬃcial, a client who pays a bribe voluntarily has a similar probability, while a client who
refuses to bribe has a much lower probability (by 16 percentage points). This points to
an oﬀsetting eﬀect between service improvements facilitated by the payment of the bribe
and the service reduction associated with the angling for a bribe, and to the punishment
of clients refusing to bribe.
Our data show that among users of oﬃcials, bribery is not a regressive tax, but is at
worst a ﬂat tax. Although we cannot directly examine whether corruption disproportion-
ately discourages the poor from using oﬃcials, the results suggest that any such eﬀect
is small. The main distributional consequence of bribery appears to be a transfer from
clients to oﬃcials, in return for no net improvement in service.
2 Corruption in Peru
The enormous scale of grand corruption in Peru was revealed in 2000 by discoveries
leading to the resignation and self–exile of the president, Alberto Fujimori. Video–taped
evidence showed that Vladimir Montesinos, Fujimori’s spy chief, had repeatedly bribed
congressmen to defect to Fujimori’s party to ensure its majority in congress. In addition,
3large bribes had enabled Montesinos to control most of the media and inﬂuence the
judiciary.9
However, Fujimori is credited with having reduced petty corruption. His adminis-
tration pursued policies reducing the role of government, which he justiﬁed not only on
eﬃciency grounds, but on the grounds that reducing the role of government would re-
duce opportunities for corruption. He attempted to reduce corruption in the police and
municipal governments, in the latter case by establishing a supervisory agency to ﬁeld
citizen complaints. However, his reforms of the judiciary are thought to have made it
more corrupt.
Despite some progress, however, several institutions with which ordinary people have
much contact were judged to be corrupt by Transparency International in a November
2001 report.10 An increase in the number of temporary judges, appointed in part to help
clear backlogs, had contributed to corruption. Such judges, representing 74 per cent of
all judges, were vulnerable to political pressure and susceptible to corruption because of
their lack of job security.
The morale of the police was thought to be lowered by poor pay and equipment, which
combined with weak internal controls and sanctions rendered them susceptible to small
and large–scale corruption, as well as to cooperation with criminals. At this time it was
customary to bribe the transit police.11
Public administration generally was corrupted by poor pay, complex procedures for
sanctioning bribe–taking, and the frequent overturning of administrative sanctions by the
judiciary. Only public servants whose contracts had been converted to private sector terms
were well–paid, but they lacked the job security that would protect them from political
interference (and, presumably, allow them to report corruption by superiors).
The interim and Alejandro Toledo administrations that followed Fujimori made cor-
ruption a priority, but focused particularly on prosecuting actors in the Montesinos aﬀair.
9See McMillan and Zoido (2004).
10Most of this section is based on this report: Transparency International (2001a). See also Trans-
parency International (2001b) and World Bank (2001a, 2001b).
11Anecdotal evidence suggests that making the Lima transit police all–female reduced bribery.
4Nevertheless, a set of anti–corruption proposals was drawn up in 2001 by a group in-
cluding representatives of civil society and the World Bank. Some initiatives put into
place include the naming of an “Anti–Corruption Tsar”, the establishment of a special
anti–corruption police division, and the introduction of an anti–nepotism law for the pub-
lic service. Ominously, however, the Tsar was ﬁred in December 2004 after seeking to
investigate accusations of corruption in the Toledo administration.12
3 Theoretical Model
In our theoretical model, two agents, the public oﬃcial and the client, interact in a two–
stage game. The oﬃcial has a monopoly on the service he provides. The oﬃcial plays
ﬁrst, and decides whether to angle for a bribe or not. If the oﬃcial does not angle for
a bribe, he carries out his job ‘honestly’ in both stages (which means not shirking, and
following required procedures, including possibly unnecessary red tape). If he angles for
a bribe, he shirks in the ﬁrst stage, which either conveys to the client that she should
bribe, or sets the stage for the oﬃcial actually asking for a bribe. There is no distinction
between these two possibilities in the model, but we assume that either way the oﬃcial
can set the amount of the bribe. The client then bribes, or does not bribe. If she does
not bribe, the oﬃcial punishes her by shirking in the second stage as well.13
For bribery to be attractive to both oﬃcial and client, it must yield something ben-
eﬁcial to both. For the oﬃcial the beneﬁt is obviously the bribe. We assume that in
return for the bribe, the oﬃcial can oﬀer a service to the client that is eﬀortless to the of-
ﬁcial: putting the client’s case at the front of the queue, or waving certain paperwork (red
tape). This is a service on top of the service provided by an oﬃcial behaving ‘honestly’
who requires compliance with all red tape.14
12www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20041217-0702-peru-corruption.html
13The client in Cadot (1987) is also punished if she refuses to bribe, but may attempt to denounce the
oﬃcial and have him ﬁred. She then attempts to conduct her business with his replacement.
14The oﬃcial’s control over red tape at low cost is reminiscent of Banerjee (1997). In his model, the
oﬃcial manipulates red tape to induce the client to reveal her valuation of the service, whereas in our
model red tape reduction is merely an inducement for the client to bribe. In Kaufmann and Wei (1999)
5The amount or value of the time or eﬀort saved by bribing can be viewed as de-
pendent on the organizational structure of the oﬃcial’s particular bureaucracy, or can
be viewed as a function of client income: the richer the client, the more valuable her
time, and the more valuable a given reduction in bureaucracy. Rose–Ackerman (1978,
chapter 6) discusses whether it is more plausible that oﬃcials practice ﬁrst–degree price–
discrimination, by charging each client a diﬀerent price, or whether they practice third–
degree price–discrimination, by oﬀering diﬀerent levels of red–tape reduction for diﬀerent
bribe amounts. We do not model the latter, but consider it in the empirical section.15
3.1 Model
If the oﬃcial is honest in both stages, he experiences disutility of eﬀort E per stage, and
utility UO per stage from having discharged his duty with appropriate eﬀort, according
to the rules and without taking bribes. His wage is normalized to zero. The total utility
of the honest oﬃcial is therefore
2(UO − E). (1)
When considering whether to angle for a bribe or not, the oﬃcial must consider
whether he can induce the client to bribe in the second stage, so we ﬁrst examine the
bribery versus punishment alternatives that follow from the oﬃcial angling for a bribe. If
the client does bribe, the oﬃcial exerts eﬀort E in the second stage and receives bribe B.
The oﬃcial’s second stage utility is therefore:
B − E. (2)
If the client refuses to bribe, the oﬃcial shirks in the second stage, exerting no eﬀort,
and has a utility of zero. Therefore, the oﬃcial prefers receiving a bribe to punishing the
client by shirking if the bribe gives more utility than the disutility of eﬀort:
B > E. (3)
the oﬃcial increases the amount of red tape to induce the client to bribe to reduce it.
15Price–discrimination is not inconsistent with the claim often made that for particular transactions
‘everyone knows how much you have to bribe’. People in rich circles may know the price for rich people,
and be unaware that people in poor circles ‘know’ a lower price.
6To induce the client to bribe, however, the oﬃcial must make an oﬀer that is attractive
to the client. If she bribes, the client receives utility E from the eﬀort the oﬃcial is
exerting, and receives utility R from having reduced bureaucracy. If she refuses to bribe,
she will simply get utility UC from having refused to bribe, and no utility from services
from the oﬃcial who is exerting no eﬀort. R, UC and UO are independent. The client
therefore chooses to bribe if E + R − B > UC, which implies
B < E + R − UC. (4)
From (3) and (4), if both oﬃcial and client prefer bribery, it must be that R > UC:
the beneﬁt to the client from reduced bureaucracy must be greater than the utility she
gets from refusing to bribe. This may be because the service provided by that oﬃcial is
particularly bureaucratic, because the client is rich and thus values time highly, or because
the client has few scruples.
3.2 The oﬃcial can observe the client’s scruples
Initially we assume that the oﬃcial can observe the client’s UC: below we relax this.
The oﬃcial cannot aﬀect the utility he or the client gets from punishment, but he can
maximize the utility he gets from bribery (2) by picking the largest bribe B subject to the
constraint that the client will choose to bribe (4). This means the oﬃcial will choose16
B
∗ = E + R − UC. (5)
The oﬃcial can get a higher bribe if he has something more valuable to oﬀer in time
savings (R), if the client is unscrupulous (low UC) or if normal eﬀort E is high (the client
has a lot to lose from punishment). The oﬃcial’s utility in the second stage if the client
bribes is therefore given by substituting (5) into (2):
R − UC. (6)
The expression does not depend upon normal eﬀort E, because the bribe will com-
pensate for this. The oﬃcial therefore decides whether or not to angle for a bribe by
16We assume that when the client is indiﬀerent she chooses to bribe.
7comparing the total utility of honest behavior (1) with the sum of second stage utility
from bribery (6) and zero utility from shirking in the ﬁrst stage. He chooses honesty if
2(UO − E) > R − UC, which implies
UO > E +
R − UC
2
. (7)
The oﬃcial chooses honesty if he has high scruples (high UO), and chooses to angle
for a bribe if he can oﬀer the client something valuable compared to the client’s scruples
(high R − UC), and if the normal eﬀort E of being honest is high (bribery is appealing
because no eﬀort is exerted in the ﬁrst period). It is irrelevant whether the client prefers
honesty or angling for a bribe, since the oﬃcial’s monopoly position allows him to choose.
If R < UC either the oﬃcial or the client will not accept bribery, and the oﬃcial will
choose between honest behavior (1) and shirking in both stages (zero utility). He will
choose honesty if the utility from honesty is greater than the eﬀort of work:
UO > E. (8)
The model does not explicitly incorporate a danger that the oﬃcial will be caught
either shirking or bribing. However, the structure of the model is the same as that of the
following model. The oﬃcial has no scruples (UO = 0), but with probability δ, the oﬃcial
risks being caught if he shirks or takes a bribe. If he is caught, his wages are docked by F,
or he must pay a bribe of F to his superior to avoid being ﬁred.17 By choosing to angle for
a bribe, he therefore has an expected loss of 2δF from being caught. The solution to this
model is given by equations (7) and (8) with UO replaced by δF, and the interpretation
is that the oﬃcial is less likely to angle for a bribe if the probability of detection δ is high,
or the punishment F is high.18
17Andvig and Moene (1989), Cadot (1987) and Rose–Ackerman (1978, chapter 9) model interactions
with corrupt superiors. See also Prendergast (2001).
18Mookherjee and Png (1995) present a model that overturns this simple intuition.
83.3 The oﬃcial cannot observe the client’s scruples
It is plausible that the oﬃcial knows R. If R is principally a parameter describing the
oﬃcial’s bureaucracy he will know it, and if R represents the client’s ability to pay, the
oﬃcial can judge this at least to some extent from the client’s appearance and address. It
is less plausible that an oﬃcial can evaluate the client’s aversion to dishonesty (UC). We
assume, however, that the oﬃcial knows the distribution of UC, and chooses B∗ with this
knowledge. Some clients will now choose not to bribe if the oﬃcial angles for a bribe.19
Under these circumstances, a risk–neutral oﬃcial who angles for a bribe picks the
bribe to maximize the expected payoﬀs.20 The payoﬀ from punishing the client is zero for
the oﬃcial, so the oﬃcial’s problem reduces to maximizing the probability of the client
agreeing to bribe (γ) times its payoﬀ, with the latter given by (2).
Assume that UC is uniformly distributed along the interval [UC,UC]. If the oﬃcial
asks for a bribe, (4) implies the client will pay it if
UC < E + R − B. (9)
The probability γ that the client pays is therefore
γ = P(UC < E + R − B) =
E + R − B − UC
UC − UC
. (10)
The oﬃcial therefore picks B to maximize γ(B − E):
max
B
E + R − B − UC
UC − UC
(B − E). (11)
From the ﬁrst order condition,
B
∗ = E +
R − UC
2
. (12)
The bribe maximizing the expected utility from angling for a bribe with heterogeneous
clients with unobservable scruples is increasing in the eﬀort E required to do the oﬃcial’s
19In a diﬀerent model the client could signal her willingness to bribe. Our modelling of the oﬃcial
moving ﬁrst is inspired by the empirical results.
20Cadot (1987) examines closely the implications of the oﬃcial’s being risk averse.
9job honestly (punishment is costly to the client), and increasing in the surplus available
for the least scrupulous client (R − UC).
From (12) and (10), the probability of the client bribing is
γ =
1
2
(R − UC)
(UC − UC)
, (13)
while from (12) the payoﬀ B − E is
1
2
(R − UC). (14)
The expected payoﬀ γ(B − E) from angling for a bribe is the product of the two:
1
4
(R − UC)2
(UC − UC)
, (15)
and the oﬃcial chooses honest behavior over angling for a bribe if (1) is greater than (15),
and therefore:
UO > E +
1
8
(R − UC)2
UC − UC
. (16)
The oﬃcial is likely to choose honest behavior over angling for a bribe if he has high
scruples (UO), and is likely to angle for a bribe if normal eﬀort E is high (he need not exert
any eﬀort in the ﬁrst period), if there is a narrow range of scruples among clients (the
less desirable punishment outcome can more frequently be avoided), and if the surplus
available for the least scrupulous client is high.
If R < UC, either the oﬃcial or the client will not want bribery (which means the
corner solution of γ = 0 will not arise). In this case the oﬃcial’s choice is between honest
behavior and punishment. The oﬃcial will prefer honest behavior if UO > E, as in the
case when the client’s scruples are observable.
If R > 2UC −UC, the oﬃcial would like to set a bribe that induces γ > 1 of the clients
to bribe. Since this is impossible, he chooses a corner solution, where he picks the bribe
that just persuades all clients to bribe (γ = 1), using (10):
B
∗ = E + R − UC. (17)
At this corner solution the oﬃcial’s (positive) utility is R − UC, and he chooses honesty
over angling for a bribe if 2(UO − E) > R − UC, and hence UO > E + 1
2(R − UC).
10The model can easily be extended to the case where the disutility to the oﬃcial of
providing normal eﬀort (EO) is not equal to the utility his normal eﬀort provides to the
client (EC). This allows for the possibility that richer clients value normal service more
than poorer clients. The only qualitative diﬀerence with this extension is that if EC is
high enough relative to EO, the oﬃcial can extract a bribe in return for only normal
service in the second stage, providing no reduction in bureaucracy (R = 0).
3.4 Empirical implications
Although we cannot observe a client’s utility, we have measures in the data of the quality
of the service she receives. The model predicts that the clients receiving the worst service
are those who refuse to bribe when a bribe is angled for: they receive zero service. Clients
receiving honest service receive 2E in services from the oﬃcial, while those paying a bribe
receive E + R. If we view R as an organizational parameter, the diﬀerence in service
between these two groups is E − R, where R is the average R computed over oﬃcials
who successfully angle for a bribe (and therefore higher than when computed across all
oﬃcials). In the model R and E are independent, so the gap cannot be signed, but the
empirical work can give the relevant magnitudes for the oﬃcial–client pairs where a bribe
is exchanged. If E − R is positive, clients dealing with an oﬃcial acting honestly are
better oﬀ in equilibrium, since the eﬀort he provides in the ﬁrst stage more than oﬀsets
the bureaucracy reduction his acting dishonestly provides in the second stage.
The model predicts the relation between income and bribery, if we instead interpret
the utility R as stemming from a valuation of reduced bureaucracy. The rich have higher
R, so are more willing to bribe and to pay a higher bribe conditional on bribing, for
given scruples. The oﬃcial is therefore more likely to angle for a bribe from a rich than a
poor client. It is ambiguous whether the probability of refusing a bribe compared to the
probability of the oﬃcial acting honestly is larger for the rich or the poor: the rich are
less likely to face an oﬃcial acting honestly, but are less likely to refuse to pay a bribe if
one is angled for.
114 Data
4.1 The survey
We use data from a large, nationally and regionally representative, household survey
from Peru. The Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO), conducted yearly by Peru’s
national statistical agency Instituto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica e Informaci´ on (INEI), con-
tains detailed information about individual and household characteristics. Rural regions
are over–sampled. Over 18,000 households responded to each of the 2002 and 2003 sur-
veys. Of particular importance to our study, in 2002 and 2003 the ENAHO included a
detailed module on governance, democracy and transparency that gathers information
about the use of public oﬃcials. One respondent per household (half are the household
head) is asked numerous questions pertaining to the household’s use of 21 diﬀerent types
of oﬃcials. If a particular type of oﬃcial was used in the last twelve months, then re-
spondents are asked a series of questions in connection with use of this oﬃcial type in
this time–frame, and possible bribery: whether the oﬃcial asked for a bribe, gift, tip or
“coima” (slang for bribe), whether the respondent felt obliged to bribe, bribed voluntarily,
or refused to bribe, and the amount of the bribe if she bribed.
The module also asks respondents about the quality of the services received from the
oﬃcial type: whether they saw an oﬃcial immediately, the number of visits to the oﬃcial,
whether they concluded their business with the oﬃcial, whether they consider the services
received to be “good”, “regular” or “bad” and whether they wasted signiﬁcant time or
money in connection with using the oﬃcial (for example, on transportation). It is not
possible to know for how many diﬀerent purposes the client used the oﬃcial. The question
about the amount paid speciﬁes that the value of in–kind payments should be included,
but is ambiguous about whether the amount should be the sum or the average of bribes
paid to the oﬃcial type.21
21“On average, what was the total...?”
124.2 Descriptive statistics
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show 4.9% of households, and 5.7% of households using at least
one oﬃcial, reported having bribed (or tipped etc.) or refused to bribe in the previous
twelve months (a bribery “episode”). As we discuss in detail in the Data Appendix,
although this is likely to be an underestimate of the true bribery episode rate, we do not
believe the underestimation to be severe. Table 1 column 3 shows that among households
that had experienced at least one bribery episode, the average number of episodes was
only 1.2. Most households (87% in column 1) had used at least one type of oﬃcial, and
the average number used was 2.5. Household quarterly consumption is greater in the
sample of respondents who reported a bribery episode: 5025 Nuevos Soles compared to
3656 Nuevos Soles for all households (one Nuevo Sol is about 30 U.S. cents). The share of
extremely poor households is correspondingly lower in the bribery episode sample. The
magnitude of the bribes relative to quarterly consumption is relatively low, at 2% in
column 4. Appendix Tables 1 and 2 provide means of other respondent and household
characteristics.
Table 2 provides the characteristics of bribery episodes using household–oﬃcial pairs
as the unit of observation (the unit of observation for the rest of the paper). For pairs
where a bribery episode occurred, in 48% of cases the oﬃcial solicited the bribe, in 22%
of cases the respondent felt obliged to bribe, and in only 8% of cases did the respondent
voluntarily bribe (column 3). The respondent refused to bribe in 22% of cases.
The average number of visits to oﬃcials is about ﬁve for all users and for the bribery
episode samples, but this average conceals an unusual distribution: as shown in column 2,
21% of users visit the oﬃcial twelve times. Clients with twelve visits are concentrated
among the water, gas and electric utilities, and to a lesser extent the state banks. These
are presumably monthly users transacting more routine business than other clients, such
as paying bills. This interpretation is supported by the fact that among clients with a
bribery episode, only 3% had twelve visits. We therefore view visiting twelve times as a
proxy for the monthly use of simple services.
13Although 93% of clients concluded their business, the share is only 74% for those with
a bribery episode. This pattern is replicated qualitatively with the other measures of
service: whether it was judged to be good or bad by the client and whether the client saw
the oﬃcial immediately. Service is always worse for the bribery episode sample. Given
the phrasing and position of the question on concluding business, a positive response does
not appear to imply necessarily that the business was concluded successfully. We view
this variable as a proxy for the speed of service, whatever the outcome.
Certain oﬃcials have a disproportionate share of bribery episodes relative to the share
of households using the oﬃcial. Table 3 lists oﬃcial types, with some types combined,
in order of their share of bribery episodes. (The Data Appendix gives the full list of
oﬃcial types.) The police account for 35% of bribery episodes (column 2) and the city
(municipal) government for 21%, with the judiciary in third rank with 12%. These three
institutions account for 68% of bribery episodes. Column 3 shows that these institutions
are even more dominant in terms of total bribe payments: the judiciary alone accounts
for 42% of the money paid in bribes, followed by the police with 27% and city government
with 11%, making a total of 80%. As the judiciary and police are only used by 4% and
6% of households respectively (column 4), it is clear that these institutions are extremely
corrupt.
5 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Our empirical tests fall into two categories: tests of who pays bribes, and tests of the
payoﬀs for the parties involved. The unit of observation is the household–oﬃcial pair. For
the ﬁrst category we run regressions on diﬀerent samples with the following speciﬁcation:
Yijt = µj + γt + β1Wit + Xitβ
0
2 + β3Zijt + ijt (18)
where j indexes the oﬃcial type, i the household and t the survey year, and Yijt is the
outcome variable of interest: probability of a bribery episode (either for the full sample,
or for the sample of observations where the oﬃcial is used), probability of using an oﬃcial
14(full sample), or number of visits to the oﬃcial (sample where the oﬃcial is used). µj are
oﬃcial–type ﬁxed eﬀects, γt is a dummy for the 2003 survey, Wit is a measure of (log)
household income or consumption, or a poverty indicator, and Xit contains the other
characteristics of the respondent and household. The only covariate Z varying by i and
j is a dummy for whether a household visited a particular oﬃcial type twelve times.
According to the dependent variable, (18) is estimated using probits or ordinary least
squares.
When we are interested in the payoﬀ to bribery, for the oﬃcial or the client, we
estimate equations of the following form:
Hijt = µj + γt + β1Wit + Xitβ
0
2 + β3Zijt + BXijtβ
0
4 + ijt. (19)
The notation and speciﬁcation here are the same as in (18), except that BXijt are dummies
for whether the respondent had one of the possible bribery episodes (bribed voluntarily,
felt obliged to bribe, was asked by the oﬃcial to bribe, and was asked but refused to
bribe), and the outcomes Hijt are the (log) amount of bribe paid (for the sample who
paid bribes), whether the client successfully concluded her business with the oﬃcial, the
client’s subjective rating of the service quality, and whether the client saw the oﬃcial
immediately (all for the sample where the oﬃcial is used). According to the dependent
variable, (19) is estimated using probits or ordinary least squares. The theoretical model
makes clear that BXijt is endogenous: in the absence of convincing instruments, we use
the theoretical model to interpret the results.
Household consumption is our preferred measure of Wit, or what we call “income” in
the model, as it may be considered a measure of permanent income. It is arguably a client’s
permanent income that an oﬃcial will best be able to assess, based on information such
as address, dress, and vehicle ownership. We report the marginal eﬀects or coeﬃcients
on the value of consumption and the consumption–based poverty indicators provided in
the data set. Results using expenditure instead of the value of consumption are very
similar. However, the eﬀects of the various income measures (net/gross, total/monetary)
are smaller, in some cases as low as one–third the size of the consumption eﬀect.
15We are concerned that measurement error may bias the consumption coeﬃcients to-
wards zero, so in addition to running the speciﬁcations reported below, we have run all
regressions instrumenting consumption with net total income.22 However, this did not in
general raise the point estimates, suggesting that measurement error is non–classical or
correlated between consumption and income. In all regressions we cluster standard errors
at the level of the district.
6 Results – Who Pays and Who Refuses?
6.1 Bribery conditional on use of the oﬃcial
We begin by examining the determinants of a bribery episode, conditional on the oﬃcial in
the household–oﬃcial pair having been used by the household. The marginal eﬀects from
these probits, multiplied by 100, are reported in Table 4. As in subsequent tables, each
column contains results from a regression where the ﬁnancial means of the household
are represented by consumption (top panel), and from a second regression where they
are represented by dummies for extreme and moderately poverty (middle panel). All
regressions contain the basic controls: the travel time to the district administrative center
and dummies for household size, town size, region and the 2003 survey.
Column 1 contains only the basic controls, while in column 2 we also control for
whether the household visited the oﬃcial twelve times (“monthly visits”), which changes
the consumption–related coeﬃcients little. The marginal eﬀect of 0.740 in column 2 of
the top panel indicates that a doubling of consumption (an increase of about one stan-
dard deviation) increases the probability of a bribery episode by (0.0074)(log2)=0.0051,
or 0.5 percentage points. As would be expected if monthly visits involve simpler and
more routine business, the dummy for monthly visits is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating
the monthly clients are 2.276 percentage points less likely to have a bribery episode. The
middle panel indicates that the extremely poor have a 1.080 percentage point lower prob-
22Where the basic regression is a probit, we used the procedure for Stata developed by Joseph Harkness,
available at http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s415801.html.
16ability of bribing than the non–poor. These eﬀects are sizeable compared to the mean
probability of a bribery episode of 2.3% in this sample.
The addition in column 3 of 20 dummies for the various oﬃcial types greatly reduces
the coeﬃcients associated with consumption. In the top panel the marginal eﬀect is
reduced by two–thirds to 0.253, while in the middle panel the eﬀect falls by 53% to
0.512 percentage points. Thus, at least half of the greater propensity of the rich to bribe
is because they disproportionately use oﬃcial types that are generally more involved in
bribery. Hunt (forthcoming) shows that such oﬃcial types are characterized by slow
service, as measured by business conclusion rates for non–corrupt dealings.
The addition of further groups of covariates in columns 4–6 of Table 4 yields consumption–
related coeﬃcients in column 6 similar to those in column 3: a doubling of consumption
increases the probability of a bribery episode by 0.2 percentage points (marginal eﬀect
of 0.277). The addition of characteristics of the respondent’s job in column 5 aﬀects
the consumption–related coeﬃcients little: the eﬀect of consumption on bribery therefore
does not principally reﬂect the types of jobs richer people have.23
Thus far, the analysis has not distinguished between types of bribery episode. We run
unreported multinomial logits allowing the bribery episode to be split into the categories
of bribed voluntarily, felt obliged to bribe, bribed because the oﬃcial solicited a bribe,
and refused to bribe. With only basic covariates, the point estimates suggest that there
is a signiﬁcant eﬀect of consumption on all bribe categories relative to no bribery episode.
Once (necessarily slightly aggregated) oﬃcial type dummies are added, the coeﬃcient for
refusing a bribe becomes insigniﬁcant, but the coeﬃcients for the diﬀerent episode types
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another.24
The theoretical model, emphasizing the oﬃcial as ﬁrst mover, predicted that rich
23We do not control for the job types of other family members, as doing this reduces the sample
size considerably. In general, however, characteristics of the respondent are much more signiﬁcant than
characteristics of other household members, suggesting the respondent underreports bribery episodes of
other household members.
24Diﬀerences between types of episode will be understated, if, as seems likely, respondents succumb to
the temptation to say that a voluntary bribe was in fact initiated by the oﬃcial.
17clients would be more likely than poor to be solicited for a bribe, or feel obliged to bribe,
and the results are consistent with this. The prediction for refusals relative to having no
bribery episode was ambiguous. The eﬀect of consumption on voluntary bribes points to
an unmodelled role for consumption in leading clients to initiate a bribe.
6.2 Use of oﬃcials
In Table 5 we present the marginal eﬀects of a probit for the relation between consumption
and use of an oﬃcial type, using the full household–oﬃcial sample. Column 1 includes only
basic covariates, and the top panel indicates that if household consumption is doubled,
the probability of using an oﬃcial rises by about (0.045)(log2)=0.031, or 3.1 percentage
points. The middle panel indicates that the extremely poor have a 5.1 percentage point
lower probability of using an oﬃcial. These eﬀects are large compared to the mean usage
rate of 12.1% in this sample. Adding further covariates successively across the columns
reduces the eﬀect of doubling consumption to 1.7 percentage points in column 5 (marginal
eﬀect of 0.025), and reduces the eﬀect of being extremely poor to 2.4 percentage points
in column 5. About half the eﬀect of consumption can therefore be explained by other
covariates, but the eﬀect remains substantial.
It is tempting to interpret the greater use of oﬃcials by richer households as reﬂecting
their generally greater demand for goods and services, but in fact we are unable to identify
supply and demand separately: although we include geographic controls and travel time to
the district administrative center, we cannot exclude the possibility that richer households
have more public services available to them. We return in a later section to the possibility
that corruption discourages households from using oﬃcials, and that this eﬀect might be
larger for the poor. The lack of a convincing exclusion restriction prevents us from directly
examining the eﬀect of expected bribes on usage.
186.3 Decomposition into use and bribery conditional on use
Unconditionally, the rich have a higher incidence of bribery episodes: the gap between the
non–poor and the extremely poor is 0.0025 in the household–oﬃcial sample. The results
of Tables 4 and 5 may be used to decompose this gap into components due to diﬀerent
usage and to diﬀerent bribery conditional on usage.
The probability of bribing P(B) is the product of the probability of using the oﬃcial
P(O) and the probability of bribing the oﬃcial conditional on use P(B|O):
Pj(B) = Pj(O) Pj(B|O), (20)
where j represents N, for non–poor, or XP, for extremely poor. The bribery gap between
the non–poor and the extremely poor population is
PN(B) − PXP(B) = PN(O) PN(B|O) − PXP(O) PXP(B|O), (21)
which can be rewritten as
PN(O)∆P(B|O) + PXP(B|O)∆P(O) (22)
or
PXP(O)∆P(B|O) + PN(B|O)∆P(O). (23)
In the household–oﬃcial data, the usage gap is 0.052, and the gap in bribery conditional
on usage is 0.013. Depending on whether the weighting of the usage and conditional
bribery gaps is that of (22) or (23), the usage gap ∆P(O) contributes either 56% or only
30% to the overall bribery gap of 0.0025.
At least 30% of the higher frequency of bribery episodes by the non–poor is therefore
because they have a higher probability of using oﬃcials. Furthermore, of the remaining
at most 70%, the middle panel of Table 4 has shown that half is caused by the fact that
the non–poor use more corrupt types of oﬃcials. Therefore, at most 35% of the higher
bribery of the non–poor is owing to a higher probability of a bribery episode conditional
on using a particular type of oﬃcial.
197 Results – What Are the Payoﬀs?
7.1 Oﬃcial’s payoﬀ: bribe amount
In Table 6, for the sample of household–oﬃcial pairs where a bribe was actually paid,
we examine the determinants of the amount of the (log) bribe. Both panels of columns
1–6 indicate that, as predicted by the theoretical model, the oﬃcial receives larger bribe
amounts from richer clients. The top panel of column 1 indicates that the consumption
elasticity of the bribe amount is 0.363 with only basic covariates included. The middle
panel indicates that the extremely poor pay 52.7 log points less, or 43%.
The marginal eﬀects of the consumption–related covariates change little as additional
covariates are added in columns 2–4. In particular, they are little aﬀected by the addition
of oﬃcial type dummies in column 3: while rich people disproportionately use oﬃcial types
who have frequent bribery episodes, they do not disproportionately use oﬃcial types who
take large bribes. The addition of the “remaining covariates” in column 5 reduces the
elasticity to 0.273.
In column 6 we control for the type of bribery episode. Compared to the omitted
bribe solicited by the oﬃcial, those feeling obliged to bribe and especially those bribing
voluntarily pay smaller bribes. This is also true when consumption (and most other
covariates) are not controlled for, in column 7. Solicited bribes may be larger because
they include a risk–premium for the oﬃcial. Alternatively, the size of the bribe across
categories may be related to the circumstances that lead to that category occurring.
The sample of bribe payers should yield information on whether the richer clients
are paying more bribes for the same level of service (ﬁrst degree price–discrimination) or
whether the oﬃcial oﬀers richer clients packages of better service for a higher bribe (third
degree price–discrimination). We can add controls to column 5 for our other measures of
service: whether the business with the oﬃcial was completed, the subjective assessment
of the service quality (as two dummy variables) and whether the client was seen immedi-
ately. The inclusion of these variables changes the consumption–related coeﬃcients little
(these results are not reported), which would appear to be support for ﬁrst–degree price–
20discrimination. However, the bribe amount is larger when the service is worse and the
conclusion rate lower, which calls into question the validity of the test.25
7.2 Client’s payoﬀ: quality of service
In this section we investigate the payoﬀ to the client of bribing or refusing to bribe,
compared to dealing with an oﬃcial acting honestly, while also allowing for the possibility
of consumption having an independent eﬀect on the payoﬀ. We measure the payoﬀ in
terms of the quality of service, for which we have several measures. Our preferred measure
is whether the client concluded her business with the oﬃcial, which we believe represents
speed of service. Marginal eﬀects from probits for the probability of completion are
presented in Table 7.
The marginal eﬀect of -0.016 in the top panel of the ﬁrst column, where only basic
controls are included, indicates that a doubling of household consumption actually re-
duces the probability of the client’s concluding her business by a signiﬁcant but small 1.1
percentage points (93% of clients conclude their business in the twelve month window).
The middle panel indicates that the extremely poor are 2.3 percentage points more likely
to conclude their business. Monthly clients are more likely to conclude their business, by
4.3 percentage points in column 2.
The inclusion of oﬃcial type dummies in column 3 cuts the absolute value of the
consumption–related coeﬃcients approximately in half: richer clients appear to get slow
service in part because they use oﬃcials who tend to give slow service, either because
the oﬃcials of that type are of lower quality, or because they deal with more complicated
and/or bureaucratic services. The consumption–related eﬀects get slightly smaller as
more covariates are included in columns 4–6. We conclude that the rich are less likely to
conclude their business, conditional on many controls, possibly because their business is
more complex.
25Table 2 showed that service is worse when a client experiences a bribery episode than when she does
not, and this relationship is discussed in the next section. The reasons for the amount of the bribe being
higher when the service is worse are presumably similar.
21In column 6 we include dummy variables for whether the client experienced a bribery
episode, distinguishing between the various bribery possibilities and refusal to bribe. As
predicted by the model, the worst service is received by those who refuse to bribe: the
probability of their concluding their business is 16.0 percentage points lower than that of
those who had no bribery episode (and hence dealt with an oﬃcial acting honestly). This
marginal eﬀect is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those for the other bribe categories.
However, those who felt obliged to bribe, or whom the oﬃcial solicited for a bribe, still
did signiﬁcantly worse than those dealing with an honest oﬃcial, by 2.8–4.8 percentage
points. This is supportive of endogeneity of the type predicted by the theoretical model:
it is likely that the oﬃcial provided slow service as a prelude to a bribe. The results
indicate that the service loss from angling for a bribe is slightly more than the service
gain provided in return for the bribe. For those who felt obliged to bribe, the results
could additionally reﬂect that they had mistaken a naturally incompetent oﬃcial for an
oﬃcial angling for a bribe. These results are consistent with those of Kaufmann and Wei
(1999), who ﬁnd that ﬁrms that commonly bribe spend more time on red tape, not less.
The eﬀects of diﬀerent bribe types are similar when the sample is split into poor and
non–poor households (results are not reported).
The theoretical model did not allow for voluntary bribes. Clients who value fast service
more than the oﬃcial can observe and who anticipate particularly slow service are likely
to bribe voluntarily. For example, a client in a hurry who discovers a particularly long
queue upon arriving in an oﬃce may seek out an oﬃcial to bribe to jump the queue. The
bribe may succeed in improving service, yet, given the bad initial situation, only bring
service up to the normal level.
We can get an idea of how service is slowed by bribery by controlling for whether the
oﬃcial was seen immediately, in column 6. Not surprisingly, seeing an oﬃcial immediately
increases the probability of concluding business, by 11.6 percentage points. More interest-
ingly, adding this control reduces each of the bribery episode coeﬃcients by at least 30%,
and reduces the gap between the refusals and the other bribery categories. This suggests
that a weapon in the arsenal of the corrupt oﬃcial, both as a signal and a punishment,
22is delaying seeing a client. It also hints at a role for bribing gatekeepers to gain access
to the oﬃcials with power. In column 7 we show that the bribery eﬀects of column 5 are
little aﬀected by the presence or absence of other covariates.
Since seeing an oﬃcial immediately or not seems to play a role in bribery, and may
even be the outcome a bribe payer is trying to inﬂuence (jumping the queue), we examine
this outcome directly in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, controlling for all household and
respondent characteristics. Poor and monthly clients are statistically signiﬁcantly more
likely to see an oﬃcial immediately (the extreme poor by 1.3–1.4 percentage points and
monthly clients by 2.1–2.2 percentage points, compared to a mean of 93%). Unreported
coeﬃcients for income are insigniﬁcant.
The marginal eﬀects on the types of bribery episode in column 2 mirror the case of
concluded business in Table 7: those involved in bribery are statistically signiﬁcantly
less likely to see an oﬃcial immediately, compared to clients engaged in non–corrupt
dealings, and especially so for those who refuse to bribe. Clients who refuse to bribe are 17
percentage points less likely to see an oﬃcial immediately, a statistically signiﬁcantly worse
outcome than for the three types of clients who do bribe. Those paying bribes solicited
by the oﬃcial are statistically signiﬁcantly worse oﬀ than voluntary bribe payers with a
ten percentage point disadvantage, similar to the nine percentage point disadvantage of
those feeling obliged to bribe. Voluntary bribe payers are 5.8 percentage points less likely
to see an oﬃcial immediately than clients dealing with an oﬃcial acting honestly.
We perform a similar exercise for the probability of the service being assessed as
bad (columns 3–5) and good (columns 6–8). Richer clients appear to be more likely to
have bad or good service. The marginal eﬀects for the bribery categories have a familiar
pattern (columns 4 and 7): those involved in bribery are worse oﬀ, while among this
group, clients refusing to bribe are worst oﬀ and voluntary bribe payers are best oﬀ. The
pattern is more pronounced for bad service than good. Controlling for the more objective
service measures, whether the oﬃcial was seen immediately and whether the business was
concluded, has little eﬀect on the relevant marginal eﬀects for good service (column 8),
but greatly reduces the absolute value of the eﬀect on bad service of refusing to bribe, from
230.37 to 0.25 in column 5. Clients refusing to bribe perceive their service as particularly
bad in part because they have been punished with slow access to the oﬃcial and slow
subsequent service.
8 Is Bribery a Regressive Tax?
The insights of the preceding sections can be combined with some simple additional
statistics to assess whether bribery can be considered to be a regressive tax, or a larger
burden on the poor than the rich. We will analyze users of oﬃcials, and speculate on how
to generalize to the whole population. We cannot judge whether bribery skews growth in
favor of the rich, however.
Among users of oﬃcials, the rich bribe more frequently, and pay higher bribes, and
the distribution of types of bribery episode is the same for rich and poor. The burden
of bribery can therefore only be higher for the poor when considered relative to income.
This is demonstrated in column 1 of Table 9, which presents expected bribes — average
bribes including zeroes — by poverty status, for household–oﬃcial pairs where the oﬃcial
is used. Extremely poor clients can expect to pay a bribe of 0.30 Nuevos Soles, compared
to 0.67 Nuevos Soles for the moderately poor and 1.63 Nuevos Soles for the non–poor. In
column 2 the expected bribe is calculated by averaging over (annual) bribes as a share
of household quarterly consumption (and multiplying by 1000). The “tax rate” on the
extremely poor and moderately poor is 0.025%, while it is 0.035% for the non–poor, and
the tax is therefore progressive.
Since the poverty indicators are based on consumption, and consumption may be
measured with error, the tax rate may be more progressive than it appears in column 2.26
To avoid this problem, we also compute the expected bribe as a share of income (in
column 3). The diﬀerences between columns 2 and 3 are not consistent with successful
correction of measurement error, as the tax is less progressive when income is used in
26Consider a poor household whose recorded consumption is erroneously high, causing the household
to be measured as non–poor and have an underestimated tax rate. The mistake in the household’s
consumption biases the non–poor tax rate down.
24column 3.
The results of Table 9 suggest that the bribery tax is a progressive, or at worst ﬂat,
tax. Using results at the household level, aggregated over oﬃcial types, only makes the
bribery tax appear more progressive, since the rich use many more oﬃcials (column 4
of Table 9 shows the usage probabilities at the household–oﬃcial level). The share of
expected (annual) bribe payments in quarterly consumption, calculated at the household
level, is 0.72% for the extremely poor, 0.75% for the moderately poor, and 1.20% for the
non–poor. These shares are somewhat progressive.
We cannot judge, however, how progressive the tax on consumption should be to
ensure the tax on household welfare is progressive. To assess the progressiveness of the
welfare tax, we exploit the survey question asking users whether they wasted signiﬁcant
time or money in connection with their business with the oﬃcial.27 We view this as a
proxy for the respondent’s perceived burden of using the oﬃcial, and we tabulate this by
poverty status in Table 10. Households who had a bribery episode were much more likely
to have wasted time or money than those who had none (83% in column 2 compared with
46% in column 1). If bribery is a greater burden on the poor, this gap should be larger
for the poor. Yet, column 3 shows that the gap is smaller for the extreme poor (0.31)
than for the non–poor (0.37), though the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. These
results are robust to moving those refusing to bribe from the bribery episode column to
the no bribery column, to moving voluntary briber payers to the no bribery column, and
to moving the analysis to a regression framework and adding covariates (not reported).
Thus, among users of public oﬃcials, bribery is at worst a ﬂat tax. Some households
may be discouraged from using oﬃcials because of the prospect of having to bribe. Lacking
an appropriate exclusion restriction, we have not been able to examine this directly. If
the poor constitute more of the discouraged, or if discouragement is more costly for the
poor, the burden of bribery on non–users could conceivably be regressive. However, the
evidence that the bribery burden for users is ﬂat suggests to us that any diﬀerential
discouragement eﬀect must be small. We therefore consider it unlikely that the burden of
27“ ¿Le ocasion´ o p´ erdida de tiempo y/o gasto signiﬁcativo en transporte u otros?”
25bribery is regressive for the whole population. We have not excluded the possibility that
the rich pay more in part because they receive more, however.
9 Conclusions
We have used theory and detailed data on households’ use and bribery of public oﬃcials
in Peru to build a framework describing the determinants of bribery, and the payoﬀs to
bribery. We establish empirically that oﬃcials discriminate between clients on the basis of
income when deciding whether to angle for a bribe and how much to ask for. Rich clients
pay more frequent and larger bribes than poor clients. Our results suggest that oﬃcials
practice ﬁrst–degree price discrimination rather than third–degree price discrimination,
but are not conclusive on this point. Overall, even as a share of income, rich clients’
spending on bribes is as much as or more than that of poor clients.
Most of the gap in the exposure of the rich and poor to bribery does not stem from
diﬀerences among clients of the same type of public oﬃcial, however. At least 30% of
the bribery episode gap between the extreme poor and the non–poor is explained by the
greater use of oﬃcials by the non–poor. This is likely the result of greater demand for
public services by the non–poor. Furthermore, at least another 35% of the gap is explained
by the fact that the non–poor use a more corrupt mix of oﬃcial types. Therefore, at most
35% of the gap is owing to a higher probability of bribery for the non–poor conditional
on using a particular oﬃcial type. Doubling a client’s value of consumption increases this
probability by 0.2 percentage points, compared to a bribery episode probability in the
relevant sample of 2.3%.
The client’s payoﬀ to bribing is merely the recouping of most of the time lost while the
oﬃcial was angling for a bribe by shirking. Refusal to bribe is punished by further shirking
on the oﬃcial’s part and results in the worst possible service for the client. Some of the
shirking and angling takes the form of refusing to see the client. In a minority of cases
involving richer clients, the client bribes voluntarily, which yields service comparable to
that enjoyed by clients engaged in non–corrupt dealings. These voluntary bribes may be
26provoked by the anticipation of particularly bad service, and may be eﬀective in bringing
the service up to the normal standard.
The tax imposed by bribery, whether measured as the share of expected bribes in
consumption, or as the gap in time or money wasted between clients of unscrupulous and
scrupulous oﬃcials, is not regressive for users of oﬃcials. Given this, we think it unlikely
that any diﬀerential deterrence eﬀect of bribery on use by the poor and non–poor would be
large enough to make the tax regressive for the whole population. The main distributional
consequence of bribery appears to be a transfer from clients to oﬃcials in return for no
net improvement in service.
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3010 Data Appendix
10.1 General
The 2002 survey was taken in October, November and December of 2002. The “2003”
survey was taken from May 2003 to April 2004. One quarter of the 2003 households
were also interviewed in 2002. We simply combine monetary values from surveys taken
at diﬀerent times with no adjustment for inﬂation or seasonality, which tests indicated
was appropriate for household consumption. A noteworthy discrepancy between 2002
and 2003 is a leap in the share of households reporting in the bribery module that they
had used a state hospital, something contradicted by the health module. Whenever we
control for oﬃcial type dummies, we therefore also permit an interaction of the state
hospital dummy with a dummy for the survey year 2003.
10.2 Oﬃcial types
The twenty–one types of oﬃcial listed in the survey are: municipal (city) government,
social security (providing social insurance other than pensions), state banks, judiciary,
drinking water, telephone, electricity, state schools, arbitration, Ministry of Agriculture,
Ministry of Industry, tax/customs authority, state hospitals, national civil identiﬁcation
registry, Department of Migration, police, electoral oﬃce, electoral court, development
agency, food agency, and “other”.
10.3 Is the bribery rate plausible?
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show 4.9% of households, and 5.7% of households using at least
one oﬃcial, reported having bribed (or tipped etc.) or refused to bribe in the previous
twelve months (a bribery “episode”). Although the share of households experiencing a
bribery episode may seem low, the bribery episode rates for some oﬃcial types are very
high (37% for the police), indicating that, at least for some oﬃcial types, respondents
were not ashamed or afraid to acknowledge a bribery episode. The stigma associated
with bribery in Peru is not large: Pro´ etica, a Peruvian anti–corruption group, found that
when asked to deﬁne the Peruvian slang for bribe (“coima”), less than half their survey
respondents gave answers with a negative connotation.28 Furthermore, the Peruvian
household survey does not attempt to force respondents to admit to having voluntarily
paid a bribe, but allows them merely to acknowledge having paid a tip under duress. We
are therefore not concerned that reluctance to report is a major issue.
The share of households bribing and the number of bribes will be understated if clients
commonly use agents to act as intermediaries between themselves and oﬃcials, and bribes
paid by the agent are reported in the survey by the agent (or no-one), rather than the
client. A 2003 survey by Pro´ etica gathered information on bribes and agents (“tramita-
28Pro´ etica (2004).
31dores”).29 52% of respondents who had bribed to obtain a driver’s licence reported having
paid the bribe to an agent, while the share was 15% or less for the other nine activities
reported in the summary statistics.30 The number of bribery episodes per household is
understated owing to the fact that each respondent can only report one bribery episode
per oﬃcial per year.
A 2004 Transparency International survey of 416 respondents in greater Lima found
14% of respondents had bribed in the previous twelve months, compared to 6.0 per cent
among the 3758 Lima respondents in our 2002–2003 data.31 However, the Transparency
question did not restrict itself to bribes paid to public oﬃcials. Pro´ etica reports much
higher bribery rates for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 of 32%, 29% and 27%, respectively.32
Pro´ etica’s bribery rates, conditional on the use of particular oﬃcials, look very similar to
those in our data, but their usage rates look implausibly high for a window of one year.
This suggests that the Pro´ etica time frame, not reported in the documentation available
to us, was in fact much longer than a year, even though yearly bribery rates are reported.
Taking the various factors into consideration, it seems inevitable that our survey some-
what underestimates bribery of public oﬃcials, but we do not believe the underestimation
to be severe. We prefer our survey to the Transparency and Pro´ etica surveys because of
its large sample, wealth of covariates and additional questions on the bribery and usage
of public oﬃcials.
29Pro´ etica (2003).
30Bertrand et al. (2005) analyze the use of agents for obtaining drivers’ licences in India.
31Transparency (2004b).
32Pro´ etica (2004).
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